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BOOK REVIEWS

THE 1978 SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Edited by PHILIP B. KURLAND and GERHARD CASPER
The University of Chicago Press, 1979. Pp. 409.
If reviewing a law review seems a fruitless task, why, one might
ask, should any attempt be made to review the Supreme Court Review? The only answer satisfactory to this "reviewer" is that it provides an opportunity to explain to those otherwise unfamiliar with
this unique annual publication what of value and interest can invariably be found within its covers.
In a sense, the Supreme Court Review defies description other
than to say that it is an annual collection of legal and law-related
articles that, for the most part, spring from decisions of the immediately preceding term of the United States Supreme Court.1 As with
many things, the Review can best be explained by reference to what
it is not:

-It is not a traditional law review;
-It is not a survey or review of the preceding Supreme Court term
as its name might suggest;
-It is not limited in coverage to cases decided during a given term;
and
-It is not a journal preserved solely for the work of lawyers.
The 1978 edition, which is the subject of this review, provides
ample evidence of the breadth and scope of content that can be
expected in any given edition. The 1978 edition covers the 1977
Term of the Supreme Court, and it highlights a number of the decisions and issues that involved the Court during that Term.
In classic Supreme Court Review style, two of the articles begin
with decisions of the Term and use those decisions as vehicles for
discussing underlying problems of law and policy. Professor Polsby
uses the decision in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting (NCCB)2 as a springboard for what is in essence an essay on
the allocation of substantive policy-making discretion between administrative agencies and the reviewing court.' Focusing on this
issue, Professor Polsby concludes that the court of appeals may have
to "refine and rationalize" its role, but that a partnership role for the
court in this field provides "an influential and constructive presence
within administrative agencies." 4
1. The Supreme Court Review is the brainchild of Professor Philip B. Kurland, who has
served as its editor since its inception in 1960. Professor Kurland was joined in 1977 by
co-editor Professor Gerhard Casper.
2. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).

3. Polsby, F.C C v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcastingand the Judicious Uses

of Administrative Discretion, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (1979).
4. Id at 36.
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On a closely related topic, Professor Scalia discusses the implications of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NationalResources
Defense Council.' He is critical of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals'
role in reviewing decisions of administrative agencies and seeks to
discern the proper role of the court of appeals in shaping administrative procedures. He also suggests reform in the Administrative Procedure Act itself.6 Both of these articles depart from specific cases of
the 1977 Term to explore serious and complex aspects of cuttingedge scope-of-review questions that are of great moment in modern
administrative law.
Two other articles focus on problem areas that were the subject of
concern in a series of cases decided during the Term. The Westen
and Drubel article7 formulates a theory of double jeopardy and seeks
to apply it using a number of double jeopardy cases from the Term
to demonstrate the need for and the application of that theory. The
authors theorize that the double jeopardy clause "protects three distinct values, each of which is independent of the others and possesses
its own respective weight." 8 This theory, the authors believe, "is
useful ... in resolving double jeopardy problems generally ...

[and]

cases." 9

is particularly useful in resolving complex
In her article on the privileges of the press,' 0 Margaret Blanchard
extrapolates from a series of press cases decided during the 1977
Term a clear principle of constitutional doctrine: there is no "unique
First Amendment privilege for the institutional press."' 1 After documenting the rebuff of the plea for special first amendment treatment
for the institutional press, Ms.. Blanchard demonstrates how the
single first amendment standard is firmly rooted in the historical
development of first amendment cases. She concludes that "the argument for a special press privilege is of dubious value at best and
dangerous at worst."' 2
A third group of articles in the volume focuses more directly on
particular cases and the impact or importance of those cases. In one
article,' I Professor Marty explores two religion cases, finding in the
5. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
6. Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C Circuit,and the Supreme Court, 1978
Sup. Ct. Rev. 345 (1979).
7. Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev.

81(1979).
8. Id. at 155.
9. Id
10. Blanchard, The InstitutionalPress andIts FirstAmendment Privileges, 1978 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 225 (1979).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 296.

13. Marty, Of Darters and Schools and Clergymen: The Religion Clauses Worse Confounded, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 171 (1979).
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Court's handling of one 1 4 "at least the 'striving for coherence,' "1 5
while in the other1 6 "any principle is as hard to find as is, beyond a
single dam site, the endangered and elusive snail darter."''7 In another article,' 8 Professor Sperlich reviews Ballew v. Georgia,1 9 and
applauds its holding that state court juries in criminal cases must, as a
matter of constitutional compulsion, be comprised of at least six
persons. 20 As an unabashed defender of twelve-person juries, Professor Sperlich welcomes Justice Blackmun's use of empirical data but
concludes that "the evidence which condemns the five-person jury
equally condemns the six-person jury. "21
In a third article highlighting individual case treatment, Professor
Schwartz reviews Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States.2 2 While approving of the result, which was to preclude a countervailing duty
intended to cover the Japanese remission of a tax on exported goods,
Professor Schwartz takes the Court to task for lack of analysis and
provides his own. 2 Despite the lack of analysis he decries, Professor
Schwartz concludes in part by conceding that "where the concerns
which move the Court are difficult to generalize and systematize into
orderliness combined
doctrine, there may be a place for2 superficial
4
with sensitivity to political reality. 5
The 1978 edition includes two interesting historical pieces that
elaborate on past cases and eras in a way that furthers our understanding of modern constitutional doctrine. In his article, 2 s Professor Benedict seeks to demonstrate that the Waite Court is unjustly
viewed as gutting the post-Civil War amendments. He argues that the
Waite Court sought to protect civil rights but within the context of a
"State-centered nationalism" 2 6 that would preserve the federal
system. In Benedict's view, the Waite Court "left a heritage of sanctioned congressional power over civil rights that was ignored by their
immediate successors and only recently resurrected, without credit
to them, by the new abolitionists of the mid-twentieth century."'7
14. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
15. Marty, supra note 13, at 189.
16. New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977).
17. Marty, supra note 13, at 190.
18. Sperlich, Trial by Jury: It May Have a Future, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191 (1979).
19. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
20. Sperlich, supra note 18, at 191.
21. Id. at 223.
22. 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
23. Schwartz, Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States: CountervailingDuties and the Regulation of InternationalTrade, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 297 (1979).
24. Id, at 312.
25. Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 39 (1979).
26. Id at 56.
27. Id. at 79.
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Finally, in perhaps the most novel of the articles,2 8 Kitch and
Bowler look behind the facts of Munn v. Illinois2 9 "in the hope that
the commercial and political context of the litigation will illuminate
the case." '3 And illuminate it does as the following facts are made
clear: (1) the grain elevators at issue in the case were run as adjuncts
of the railroads and therefore did not directly compete with one
another; (2) inspection rather than price was the major feature of the
statute; and (3) the statutory price in effect was not significantly
different from the going rate." 1 The authors observe that this "elevator price-fixing conspiracy is one of the rare reported cases of a
stable price fix and is, interestingly enough, explainable on plausible
efficiency grounds." 3 2 They conclude that Chief Justice Waite made
much of this minor case, thereby making it easier for the Supreme
Court to hold later that "[r]ailroad companies are carriers for hire
... [and] under ... Munn subject to legislative control as to their
rates of fare and freight .... -" a

What links the nine articles of the 1978 Review is the consummate
attention given to critical analysis of the Court's opinions and the
rationale (or lack thereof) underlying those opinions. In this, the
Review, fast approaching its twentieth anniversary, has remained true
to its central reason for being. In the preface to the inaugural issue,
Professor Kurland described the need for a publication to overcome
what had been described as a lack of a "tradition of sustained, disinterested and competent criticism of the professional qualities of
the Court's opinions." ' 34 As these articles and those of the prior
eighteen issues ably demonstrate, that tradition is now well established within the pages of the Supreme CourtReview.
Professor Kurland also recognized that the disciplines of political
science and the law often merge in Supreme Court opinions and
therefore the Review should serve as a "medium for the exchange of
ideas between [political scientists and lawyers] that will enlarge the
competence and understanding of both. ' 3 5 The last two articles
discussed here demonstrate how clearly the historical and political
science perspectives have been merged with legal analysis to heighten
28. Kitch & Bowler, The Facts of Munn v. Illinois, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 313 (1978).
29. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
30. Kitch & Bowler, supra note 28.
31. Id. at 315-20.
32. Id at 340.
33. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 161 (1877); see Kitch &
Bowler, supra note 28, at 343.
34. P. Kurland, Preface to 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. at vii (1960) (quoting H. Hart).
35. Id.
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understanding. It is also noteworthy that this secondary interdisciplinary goal of the Review has expanded over the years, so that in this
nineteenth annual issue four of the nine pieces are ably written by
persons from four different disciplines outside the law.
MICHAEL B.BROWDE*

*Research Associate Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.

